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Abstract 
Many countries worldwide are striving for improving the quality of care and for reducing costs in the 
health care sector by establishing large IT infrastructures. In Germany, the introduction of the elec-
tronic health card and the national telematics infrastructure is lagging years behind the original 
schedule. In this paper, we describe and analyze a case study of one selected part of this ultra-large 
intervention. The selected part is the failed implementation of the electronic prescription. The related 
activities started in 2003 and ended in 2010 when a decision was made to abandon this part of the 
intervention. We present a detailed analysis of the project and identify 14 reasons in five categories 
for the project’s failure. Furthermore, we provide a multi-layered overview of the episodes and sub-
projects. 
Keywords: electronic health card, failure, prescription, ultra-large projects, health infrastructure 
1 Introduction 
Around the world, many countries are fostering the use of IT in their health care systems. They aim at 
enhancing the information flow among different actors in the health care system in order to improve 
the quality of care and to reduce costs. However, until now, the health care sectors are often lagging 
behind compared with the IT use in other industries. To address this shortcoming, governments in 
many countries have started eHealth initiatives (Clegg and Shepherd, 2007; Conford and Hibberd, 
2014; Cripps et al., 2011; McGrath et al., 2008; Sunyaev et al., 2009a; Tamburis et al., 2011). These 
initiatives spend a lot of money for establishing new IT infrastructures. The projects for implementing 
these infrastructures do often have a tremendous size in terms of peoples involved, effort spend and 
money invested. Nevertheless, some of these projects fail to achieve their goals (KPMG, 2012a, 
2012b). 
In this paper, we address the following question: Why did the implementation of the electronic pre-
scription in Germany fail? The electronic prescription is one of the major applications for Germany’s 
electronic health card and the according telematics infrastructure. For answering the research question, 
we conducted a case study based on documentary materials.  
In the following section, we summarize related research. In the third section, we describe the methodo-
logical approach we used. In the fourth section, we present the results from our case study. In the fifth 
section, we discuss the results regarding their contribution, limitations, and the framework we used for 
our analysis. The paper closes with a summary and an outlook. 
2 Related Research 
We identified three main streams of related research. The first stream analyzes the implementation of 
large health infrastructures in Germany and other countries. The second stream covers the failure of 
IS/IT projects in general. The third stream addresses IT implementation in inter-organizational and 
ultra-large settings and projects. 
Drews & Schirmer / Failed Implementation of the ePrescription in Germany 
 
 
Twenty-Third European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Münster, Germany, 2015 2 
 
 
The German health card project has been analyzed in a few publications. Sunyaev et al. (2009a) 
describe the basic applications that are mentioned in the respective law. When this paper was pub-
lished, the decision of abandoning the electronic prescription has not been made. It provides some 
basic process models of the prescription process. The empirical evaluation in this work only focuses 
on the voluntary applications. As the electronic prescription is mandatory, this paper does not provide 
any new data regarding this application. Other papers suggest new applications which might be added 
to the telematics infrastructure in the future (Duennebeil et al., 2009) or address security issues 
(Sunyaev et al., 2009b).  
Worldwide, many other countries seek to improve their health care systems by developing and imple-
menting new IT systems. Comparative studies from KPMG revealed that many of these initiatives fail 
to achieve their goals and exceed financial and time limits (KPMG, 2012a, 2012b). In the United 
Kingdom, an electronic prescription service has been implemented as a part of the ‘National Pro-
gramme for IT’ (Cornford and Hibberd, 2014). In August 2013, around 800 general practitioners and 
10.000 pharmacies were using the new version of the prescription system (EPS R2) (ibid.). It is still in 
the implementation and rollout phase. In the Netherlands, a system for supporting the prescription 
process in the practices was established from 1999 until 2001 (Boonstra et al., 2004). The main inten-
tion of this system was to reduce costs for medication by giving advice to the physicians. There was 
no central infrastructure in place and an electronic transmission has not been part of that project. In 
Finnland, the government decided in 2000 to implement an electronic prescription system (Salmivalli, 
2006). The first clinical pilot started in 2004. By the end of 2005, only 800 electronic prescriptions 
were processed by the system. In June 2006, the pilot project ended. Other countries have also started 
similar initiatives like the US (Teich et al., 2005), Sweden (Bastholm Rahmner et al., 2004), or Spain 
(Pina Vera, 2006). Each of these programs has different starting points, contexts, implementation pro-
cesses and technical solutions (Salmivalli, 2006). Due to the limited space, we cannot provide detailed 
information on each of these projects in this paper. Furthermore, detailed information on some of these 
projects is outdated or not available. With our contribution, we seek to foster the comparison of suc-
cess and failure in these projects be giving detailed insights into the German project, which might later 
on be used for giving a multi-national overview. 
The failure of information systems has been a subject in IS research for forty years (Lucas, 1975, 
Dwivedi et al., 2014). Chris Sauers book “Why information systems fail” (Sauer, 1993) and Lyytinen 
and Hirschheim’s (1987) article on “Information system failures” are often referenced as publications 
that initiated the investigation of IS failure. A major insight of Sauer’s analysis is that failures should 
be expected and that there is no mechanism to guarantee success. He stresses that developing and im-
plementing information systems is an innovation process, which is an uncertain process by its very 
nature. Instead of trying to avoid failures by optimizing planning techniques, he argues for better ana-
lyzing the project’s context (especially regarding support, power and politics), for ongoing evaluation 
and for tracking flaws and their resolutions. Lyytinen and Hirschheim analyzed empirical literature 
and identified different classes of IS failure. They differentiate between development and use failure. 
Furthermore, they trace the reasons for failure back to the features of the IS and the IS development 
process. While this early research mainly focusses on IS failure in intra-organizational projects, more 
recent publications also analyze the failure of large inter-organizational IS projects (e. g. Kreps and 
Richardson, 2007). By drawing on the results from several large-scale public-sector IT projects in UK, 
Kreps and Richardson name some common problems in these projects including a creeping scope and 
escalating costs (ibid.). In 2014, Dwivedi et al. still see research on IS success and failure as a promi-
nent stream in IS research (Dwivedi et al., 2014). They demand for an extended perspective, which 
takes multiple perspectives into account, moves beyond too narrow considerations of the IT artifact 
and includes rather unexplored organizational contexts (such as the public sector). 
As the third and last stream of research relevant to our topic, we draw on the literature on ultra-large 
projects and projects in inter-organizational settings. Project planning and management gets in-
creasingly complex with the growing size of projects (Priemus et al., 2008). Additionally, in many of 
these settings, no central governance exists like in hierarchical organizations (Lundrigan et al., 2014). 
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In internationally distributed large firms, interventions of ultra-large scale are performed and a grow-
ing amount of knowledge on how to conduct them is available. However, despite of distributed and 
stepwise roll-out in different countries, these transformations are still characterized by a central gov-
ernance and they are driven by standardization (regarding both, processes and IT). In contrast, in the 
German health care system, many actors act rather autonomously. First and continuously, they need to 
be convinced to participate in a common project. The research subject in such settings lies beyond a 
focal (even internationally distributed) organization, but it is constituted by an inter-organizational 
construct (including the patient/customer and hence even beyond a network organization). In IS re-
search, there is a long tradition in analyzing the development and implementation of inter-
organizational information systems (IOIS) (Barrett and Konsynski, 1982; Elgarah et al., 2005; Rodon, 
2006) including the health care sector. In our research, we seek to capture the extended environment 
with the concept of business ecosystems (Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Moore, 1993; Moore, 1996), as it is 
based on the idea of autonomous actors and because it stresses the relevance of economic relations 
instead of technical systems. Nevertheless, business ecosystems today are of a socio-technical nature 
and often rely on ultra-large IT systems (Feiler et al., 2006). This extended perspective requires new 
tools and methods for planning and conducting interventions and might lead to different results when 
analyzing the failure of interventions. 
3 Methodological approach 
For analyzing the focal project, we decided to conduct a case study based on documentary materials 
(Bowen, 2009). As the project for implementing the electronic health card is funded with public mon-
ey, many relevant documents are available to the public. These documents contain laws, project plans, 
cost-benefit analyses, evaluation reports and press releases. We iteratively searched for relevant mate-
rials regarding the implementation of the electronic health card. By drawing on intermediate results 
from our analysis, we identified questions that required further material to be answered. 
As the phenomenon we investigate goes beyond the borders of a single organization, we needed a 
guiding frame for our analysis, which takes account for this extended perspective. In this paper, we 
draw on the framework for analyzing IT-based interventions in business ecosystems from Drews et al. 
(2014). This framework has been developed by reflecting three cases of large IT implementation pro-
jects in different industries, including the project of the electronic health card implementation in Ger-
many. It includes a structural and a dynamic perspective with seven basic concepts in each perspective 
(see Table 1). For a detailed description of these concepts see Drews et al. (2014). 
 
Structural perspective  Dynamic perspective 
A1: The system and its borders  B1: Project’s drivers and goals 
A2: The system’s environment and its influences  B2: Potentials of IT innovations 
A3: Actors and classes of actors  B3: Co-design on multiple layers 
A4: Strategic business relations and competition  B4: Design alternatives and implications for  
transformation 
A5: Operational processes, information and  
material flow 
 B5: Adoption and transformation plans 
A6: IT/IS, infrastructure, networks, standards, data 
and information 
 B6: Overall assessment 
A7: Spatial structure  B7: Realization of operations and monitoring 
Table 1. Basic concepts of business ecosystem’s dynamic and structural perspectives according 
to Drews et al. (2014) 
 
Drews & Schirmer / Failed Implementation of the ePrescription in Germany 
 
 
Twenty-Third European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Münster, Germany, 2015 4 
 
 
We are aware of research projects, which applied the actor network theory (ANT) for similar cases 
(see e.g. Greenhalgh and Stones, 2010; Rodon et al., 2008). While we see the value of the ANT for a 
long-term process perspective, we seek a stronger conceptual basis for the structural perspective. The 
ANT starts with a “flat ontology” and demands for treating all kinds of actors alike in the beginning 
(Latour, 2005). Unlike the ANT, we see a layered structure – or architectural perspective based on the 
methods of enterprise architecture management – as a mean for better supporting the analysis of the 
environment in which a large-scale intervention takes place (Drews and Schirmer, 2014). 
4 A case study on the failed implementation of the electronic pre-
scription in Germany 
In this section, we describe our analysis of the failed project for implementing the electronic prescrip-
tion in Germany’s health care system. As mentioned in the previous section, we use the categories 
from the above mentioned framework for guiding our analysis. In the following, we refer to the 
framework’s concepts in the text by naming the respective concepts in brackets (A1, A2, etc.). 
4.1 Drivers and goals of the electronic health card project and related IT in-
novations 
We start by describing the project’s drivers and goals (B1). Since 1993, Germany’s compulsory health 
insurance has issued a chip card to all its members (around 70 million people). In the late 1990s, a 
study from Roland Berger & Partner, a consulting company, revealed that Germany has not yet adopt-
ed and implemented innovative eHealth technologies (Roland Berger & Partner, 1997). This study 
lead to several discussions and initiatives, but none of them had the power and size of the health card 
project that followed some years later. The lipobay drug scandal in 2001 was often referred to as being 
a major trigger for the health card project (Weichert, 2004). The inability of identifying possible drug 
combinations with adverse effects lead the government to think about how to avoid such problems in 
the future. In 2003, the ministry for health and social security finished a bidding process and a project 
called “bIT4health” (“better IT for better health”) was started. In this project, a consortium of IBM, a 
Fraunhofer research institute, SAP, ORGA (a chip card system developer) and InterComponentWare 
defined a basic architecture for the future telematics infrastructure (Bunz et al., 2004). In the same 
year, the German Government passed a law for modernizing the compulsory health care system. As a 
part of this law, the introduction of a new chip card (called “electronic health card”) and a national 
telematics infrastructure was codified. According to this law, the new health card should be introduced 
by the first of January 2006.  
The law § 291a SGB V also describes the services (or applications), which the new electronic health 
card should provide. Beyond the functionality of identifying the insured, it also includes the European 
Health Insurance Card (EHIC). The EHIC is not chip card based. It consists of standardized insurance 
data printed on the back of each electronic health card. The third mandatory service defined by the law 
is the electronic prescription service. It should allow the transmission of electronic prescriptions. In 
addition to these mandatory services, the electronic health card should support nine optional services. 
“Optional” in this case means that patients can decide on their own if they want to use these services 
or not. These optional services comprise the collection, processing and use of the following data: (1) 
medical data for emergency treatment, (2) electronic physician letter, (3) drug safety data, (4) electron-
ic patient record, (5) data provided by the patient, (6) data on health services used by the patient and 
their costs, (7) data on the patient’s will regarding the donation of organs, (8) data regarding the place 
where information on the patient’s will regarding the donation of organs is stored and (9) data on the 
advance directive and the appointment of a healthcare proxy. 
The whole idea of the project was also supported by the potentials of IT innovations (B2). The chip 
card technology made progress and new card generations could provide more space for storing data 
and allow to perform digital signatures. Furthermore, software for checking medication for adverse 
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drug effects was realized. However, such software was only used by a few actors when the project be-
gan. And third, based on the growing influence of the internet and related technologies for building 
large interoperable and distributed systems, the realization of a complex national health IT infrastruc-
ture became into reach. 
4.2 The structure of the intervention’s socio-technical ecosystem 
In the next step, we describe the socio-technical ecosystem, in which the ultra-large intervention takes 
place following the framework’s structural perspective. According to the framework, we first have to 
clarify the system and its borders (A1). The system we are analyzing is bounded by Germany’s bor-
ders. Health care legislation in Europe is still the domain of the European Union’s member states. Fur-
thermore, we have a strong sectoral border with the focus on the health care system. Due to the inter-
vention’s scope, not only health providers and their associations but also vendors for health care IT 
belong to the ecosystem. The (unclear) intermingle between decision makers from politics and legisla-
tive authorities in health care – inside the ecosystem – and general political episodes – which we posi-
tion outside the ecosystem – add to the complexity of this health ecosystem. 
Since the health care system is of high value for most people, it is an important part of society in gen-
eral. As Germany’s population is aging, the health care system is expected to be under pressure in the 
future. The expenditures for health services will rise due to the increasing percentage of elderly peo-
ple. Today, the health expenditures have already started to increase not only because of the aging soci-
ety but also because of high costs for new medical technologies and drugs. On the basis of these “ex-
ternal” influences, the health care system is under continuous pressure for improving the quality of 
care and keeping costs under control at the same time (A2: the systems’ environment and its influ-
ences). 
The intervention aims at influencing the work and life of a tremendous amount of different “inhabit-
ants” in the health care system. For gaining an overview, we need to identify relevant actors (A3: ac-
tors and classes of actors). Additionally, we need to define classes of these actors and to count the 
actors in each class. Furthermore, the concept of “actors” refers to considering their responsibilities 
and interests. First, the patients are part of the system in their role of insured people and service con-
sumers. Hence, the intervention effects the whole population. The compulsory health insurance system 
in Germany covers about 70 million people. The private health insurance system serves about 9 mil-
lion people with its full tariffs (meanwhile, the private insurance companies abandoned the project – 
see below). The main interest of the patients is to receive state-of-the-art medical treatment when 
needed. Regarding the goals of the health card project, the interests of patients are quite diverse. Peo-
ple with chronic diseases are often mentioned as being more interested in a better IT infrastructure as 
they suffer from media discontinuities and barriers in the information flow between different actors. 
Second, the health care providers need to participate in the project. 120.000 registered physicians are 
working in about 90.000 practices scattered all over the country (BMG, 2014). About 2.000 hospitals 
and more than 20.000 pharmacies are involved (ibid.). Third, around 150 compulsory health insurance 
companies and more than 40 private health insurance companies need to set up the infrastructure and 
to issue cards for their insurants (ibid.). 
Beyond these core classes of actors, many (German and international) software and hardware vendors 
also participate in the intervention. The vendors had to develop new devices and to modify their soft-
ware to meet the requirements defined in the specifications. According to a statistic based on the am-
bulatory billing data of practices and hospitals, there were 176 different software solutions used in 
Germany (KBV, 2014). 22 of those 176 are installed in more than 1% of the practices (ibid.). Hence, 
the changes required to connect practices to the telematics infrastructure have to be realized in all 176 
software systems.  
Each of the classes of actors mentioned above has a powerful national representative association. 
These associations bundle the interests of their members and play an important role in the so-called 
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“self-administration”. This, together with the political and legislative agents, form the specific decen-
tralized responsibility of governance for strategy and overall decision making. 
For understanding the health care system, we also need to take a closer look at strategic business re-
lations and competition (A4). Many of these relations are shaped by the large number of laws regu-
lating the health care system. Physicians, for example, need be registered at the compulsory health 
care system to be allowed to bill for services provided to the people insured by this system. As a fur-
ther example, the market for pharmacies is highly regulated in Germany. Each pharmacist may only 
own up to four pharmacies. This leads to a fragmented situation without any larger players in the mar-
ket. 
In the next step, the framework guides us to look at operational processes as well as at information 
and material flows (A5). The core prescription process is rather simple, yet cross-organizational. The 
patient plays a central role in it: A patient visits a physician (of his or her choice) who – if needed – 
issues a prescription on a defined form and hands it over to the patient. The patient carries the pre-
scription to the pharmacy (again of her or his choice) and receives the drug after passing the prescrip-
tion to the pharmacist. In some cases, the patient has to pay a certain amount on her or his own. The 
pharmacist passes the prescription forms to a billing service provider. These companies scan and digit-
ize the prescription and transfer the data to the patients’ insurance companies. The pharmacies than 
receive the payment from the respective insurance companies.  
As the intervention intended to change this cross-organizational process, we have to take the number 
of actors of the different actor classes involved and the number of prescriptions per year into account. 
The process of issuing a prescription has more than 600 million instances per year in Germany (Ge-
matik, 2006). Zooming into practices, this means that a physician may issue up to 50 or 100 prescrip-
tions per day. 
When large national interventions strive for implementing a new infrastructure, they need to consider 
the existing IT landscape with its networks, servers, applications and the data stored in these systems 
(A6: IT/IS, infrastructure, networks, standards, data and information). When the health card pro-
ject began, nearly all physicians, hospitals and pharmacists had an application for supporting their ad-
ministrative processes in place (practice information system or pharmacy information system). In most 
practices, internet access was available. Though, many of them had a dedicated network for the prac-
tice information system, following a recommendation of the Association of Statutory Health Insurance 
Physicians. The infrastructure and diverse existing application systems in the practices, hospitals and 
pharmacies became relevant as the health card project planned to connect these service providers to 
the national telematics infrastructure. Additionally, the new chip card terminals should be connected 
via network. The practices needed to provide additional network outlets and were expected to connect 
their systems to the infrastructure via a connector box in the future.  
While in other industries, production processes are centralized in large facilities or are scattered 
around the world in global value chains, the provision of health services is rather decentralized. Physi-
cians and hospitals are expected to be reachable for patients without travelling too far. This spatial dis-
tribution of the actors (A7: spatial structure) is relevant to the project as the technical infrastructure 
needs to reach out to all those distributed organizations and locations. Technical and organizational 
changes effect these distributed entities. Therefore, the project has to plan and anticipate how this 
change can be achieved. 
4.3 The intervention’s course of episodes and events 
After we have described the socio-technical ecosystem in which the intervention took place, we now 
retrace the course of episodes and events in the overall 10-year period of the intervention based on a 
structured timeline. For providing a better overview, we created a graphical representation of the epi-
sodes (see Figure 1). In order to structure the large number of events on a time line, we assigned them 
to different layers.  
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Figure 1. Electronic prescription in Germany – timeline with events and projects 
We used the following layers for structuring the episodes and events: 
 Governance & management layer: setting overall goals; reprioritizing and taking responsi-
bility for the overall intervention; planning, coordinating, directing and initiating the monitor-
ing/evaluating of the ultra-large intervention 
 Design & planning layer: designing the intervention and redesigning the ecosystems’ archi-
tecture (processes, IT landscape, IT infrastructure), in the large and in the small 
 Development layer: developing and/or adopting new technologies of the to-be IT landscape 
and infrastructure forming a prerequisite for the intervention 
 Transformation layer: test and rollouts for performing the intervention, changing the archi-
tecture in the ecosystem  
 Evaluation layer: activities to analyze the intervention’s overall status and performance  
 Operational layer: providing successive services needed in the roll-out and post-rollout, i. e. 
post intervention together with monitoring facilities (not included here as a roll-out beyond the 
test phase did not take place so far). 
Overall, due to the complexity and magnitude of involved actors, processes and systems, each layer 
may include a multitude of parallel projects. These are (partly) coordinated by the management layer 
and (partly) enforced by law. Additionally, each project needs to be adopted to the local context (e. g. 
of a certain hospital or IT vendor). According to the different character of projects on each layer, we 
introduce different project types and name them accordingly, design-, development-, transformation-
(i.e. test and rollout), operational-related projects. 
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Governance and management layer: We start describing the course of events by going along the 
timeline of strategic decisions that took major influence on the projects. Since the 1990s, several dis-
cussions in Germany took place regarding national activities on fostering the use of IT in the health 
care system. The potentials of eHealth technologies increased with the growing internet and new pos-
sibilities provided by IT. Additionally, as described above, the lipobay scandal happened and the poli-
cy makers searched for new ways to prevent such events in the future. In 2003, the Government 
passed a law to modernize the compulsory health care system. As a part of this law, the introduction of 
a new electronic health card and the according infrastructure – based on the results of the architectural 
design project (see design and planning layer) – was defined as a goal. The law determined that this 
introduction should be done by January 1, 2006. The new law became effective on January 1, 2004.  
In March 2004, a project office called “protego.net” was installed as a new management actor. This 
office was transformed into a new organization called “gematik”. This organization started its opera-
tion on January 11, 2005. Several months later, a new government was elected. The new government 
planned to reorganize the project. At this point, the whole project was far away from its original 
schedule as defined in the 2004 documents. In 2005, a new ordinance was passed. It defined how the 
lab and field tests should proceed. After the planned start date of January 2006 had passed, the minis-
try of health decided that eight test regions (called “model regions”) should carry out the tests together 
with the gematik and the other actors involved. In October 2006, the ordinance for the test phase pro-
cedure was changed again leading to new and more detailed test plans. 
By the end of 2006, the test regions were ready to start with the field tests. Only a few months later, 
when the first experiences were made in the test regions, the German Medical Assembly (representa-
tion of all physicians in Germany) agreed on a statement saying that they do not support the electronic 
health card project as it was planned at that point of time. In July 2009, the private insurance compa-
nies left the project as they did not see any positive returns on the required investments.  
In 2009, a new government was elected. It again decided to reorganize the project based on the results 
of the experiences, which were made during the test phases. This lead to a decision on how the project 
should succeed. It was published on April 20, 2010. With this decision, the electronic prescription was 
abandoned. A new set of applications was defined to be tested and rolled out. The electronic prescrip-
tion was no longer a part of the next steps. Until today (2015), the official project plans do not include 
any details on if and when the project for implementing the electronic prescription will be part of the 
health card project in the future. The text of the law still lists the electronic prescription as a mandato-
ry application of the electronic health card. A new eHealth law is currently under way. 
Design and planning layer: In 2003, the German government launched the architectural design pro-
ject bit4health. This project had the task to develop a general architecture for the future national 
eHealth infrastructure. Two major documents called “framework architecture” and “solution outline” 
were written in this project and published in 2004. After the gematik was founded in 2005, they had 
the responsibility for developing detailed specifications. They published large sets of documents de-
scribing details of the services and infrastructure on the gematik website. Interested people could get 
involved and comment on these documents. With the ongoing project, several larger changes were 
necessary to keep up with decisions made by the governance and management layer.  
Development layer: Each software or hardware vendor (for primary or back-end systems) had its own 
projects for developing new devices or changing software according to the specifications provided by 
the design and planning layer. For example, all vendors of hospital information systems, which were 
used by one of the hospitals in the “model regions” had to be changed according to the specifications. 
Hardware vendors had to develop new card readers that are capable of accepting two cards at the same 
time. Unlike for the layers described before, there is only few information available by the hardware 
and software vendors on how large these projects were and how much time and money they invested.  
Transformation layer: Each hospital and each practice in the “model regions” had one or several pro-
jects for implementing the health card into their own processes and organization. They had to redesign 
their enterprise architecture and to perform the transformation for example in the area of patient ad-
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mission. Similarly, each physician practice had to change its infrastructure and IT-landscape together 
with its processes. 
Evaluation layer: Two major evaluations of the whole electronic health card project took place during 
the focal time period. The first was an overall cost-benefit analysis, which was not published but 
leaked shortly after it was finished. The second ended up in an evaluation report on the field tests. The 
results in this report had influence on the decisions made in 2010 to reprioritize the project’s activities. 
4.4 Reasons for the intervention’s failure 
Apart from the overall course of events, we have to focus on some details of the intervention up to its 
halt and reprioritization. For this closer consideration, we come back to the character of intervention 
projects outlined in the framework. We draw on the dynamic perspective’s concepts to systematically 
describe the 14 reasons for failure we have identified (see Table 2). 
 
# Reason Category 
1 Merely technical design focus, too less focus on processes and  
organizational change 
B3: co-design on multiple layers 2 An overall and integrated architecture was not provided in the  
beginning and not developed over time 
3 No appropriate time frames for development projects 
4 Wrong decision to start with the electronic prescription B4: design alternatives and  
implications for transformation 5 “no” by German Medical Assembly was not taken seriously 
6 Additional time has to be spend by those actors (physicians) who do 
not profit from this service 
B5: adoption and  
transformation plan 
7 Unclear benefit of nearly simultaneous starts of the field test projects 
8 inflexibility regarding the reprioritization of tasks 
9 not enough time to deeply test the technology in the laboratory 
10 cost-benefit analysis was carried out too late and not published 
B6: overall assessment 
11 negative benefit for a five and ten year perspective for the electronic 
prescription 
12 bias in cost/benefit became even worse 
13 Assessments during the course of the interventions were not taken too 
much into account 
14 governance structures were not clear and changed over time B8: intervention governance 
Table 2. Reasons for the failure of the electronic prescription project in Germany 
We start with the framework’s concept of co-design on multiple layers (B3). Drews et al. (2014, p. 6) 
describe this as “changes in the design have to be done both in the large (cross-actor processes and 
telematics infrastructure) and in the small (changed processes and extended infrastructure in the prac-
tices)”. Furthermore, the design has to be done on all layers – from governance to the operation layer 
as described in the previous sub-section and includes social dimensions as well as technical. 
Reason 1: The design focus was merely technical, processes and organizational change were not ex-
tensively considered in the first step. This is noticeable in the early and leading design documents 
(bIT4health architecture and solution outline). Co-design of processes and IT is nearly not covered in 
these documents. Considering the redesign of processes could have given indications already at design 
time that enacting an electronic prescription would require more time than a paper-based counterpart – 
a fact that was revealed much later. Another example is the assumption that standards for technical 
interfaces would be sufficient to solve challenges of inter-organizational cooperation. 
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Reason 2: An overall and integrated architecture comprising and relating different design layers to-
gether with steps from the as-is to the to-be status was not provided and not developed over time. The 
overall architecture could have had a guiding and identifying function for each of the many following 
projects, informing likewise vendors and health providers. During the intervention’s progress, it could 
have served to inform about changes in the to-be architecture due to delays or other difficulties (e.g. 
by continuation with tests offline as the infrastructure needed for online tests is not available in time). 
The overall architecture also could have been stepwise enriched by detailed project results. A possible 
stepwise realization of the overall architecture – with storing data only on the card in the first step and 
in the telematics infrastructure in a second was abandoned or not considered. At the end, the stepwise 
realization was necessary due to delays in realizing the telematics infrastructure which needed mani-
fold components and the involvement of diverse parallel development projects performed by a large 
number of vendors. 
Reason 3: The given time schedule and estimation did not include appropriate time frames for devel-
opment projects. This is surprising out of two reasons: (1) the provision of newly developed or adopt-
ed software and hardware formed an indispensable prerequisite for the next intervention steps, (2) the 
multitude of different vendors and organizations involved impeded the monitoring of in-time produc-
tion. Furthermore, delays in the implementation activities were not addressed fast enough by starting a 
necessary rescheduling. 
We continue with the concept of design alternatives and implications for transformation (B4). 
Reason 4: The choice of the electronic prescription as the starting application/service among other 
alternatives in the overall intervention to introduce the electronic health card and the telematics infra-
structure is questionable. A careful assessment about its benefit and the interests of the different actors 
involved was at least not made public. In contrast, the facts show that the chosen process has more 
than 600 million process instances per year (Gematik, 2006).  
Reason 5: The “no” by the German Medical Assembly was not taken seriously. In the early test phase 
of the project, the German Medical Association (the national association of the physicians) announced 
that they do not support the electronic health card project in the form it had at that time. Several rea-
sons were given for that decision. Three major reasons were: the need for additional data security, the 
unclear situation of costs and benefits and the negative impacts they saw for the operational processes 
in the physicians practices. 
With the next concept of the framework, we analyze the interventions’ adoption and transformation 
plans (B5). 
Reason 6: During the test phase, it turned out that the process of issuing a prescription takes more 
time than expected. The results from the test regions showed that the duration of the process increases 
from 29.5 seconds to 43 seconds (and even to 55 seconds during the test phase when the prescription 
had to be printed in addition) (Universität Bayreuth et al., 2009). Based on the assumption that some 
physicians issue up to 100 prescriptions per day, these 13.5 seconds sum up to 22.5 minutes per day. 
This additional work has not been considered in the cost-benefit calculation. Even worse, this addi-
tional time has to be spend by those actors (physicians) who do not profit from this service. Addition-
ally, the benefits of the electronic prescription were not realized, as the online billing process was not 
part of the test scenario.  
Reason 7: The benefit of nearly simultaneous starts of the field test projects in eight regions is not 
clear (with the goal of 10.000 patient in each region). Of course, in each region, local organizations 
had different IT systems (like hospital information systems and practice information systems) and dif-
ferent processes in place. Therefore, a test in different regions might have brought up some differences 
that would have been overseen if they were not included. But, due to time pressure and too few tests, 
the new systems did not work properly (as the evaluation report summarizes) (Universität Bayreuth et 
al., 2009). As a consequence, the negative experiences with the premature status of the technology was 
made by many people at the same time and thus pushed a great wave of negative impressions and feel-
ings to the public.  
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Reason 8: Though the first problems became visible very early in the test regions, the plan for intro-
ducing the different services was changed three years after the tests begun. This demonstrates an in-
flexibility regarding the reprioritization of tasks as a result of the experiences made during the test 
phases. 
Reason 9: The new technology was brought too early into the test regions. The gematik and the soft-
ware and hardware vendors did not take enough time to deeply test the technology in the laboratory. 
Otherwise, the increased time needed to issue a prescription would have been noticed earlier leading to 
the need to further improve the technology or to reprioritize the service testing.  
The concept of overall assessments (B6) puts the focus on ex-ante, intermediate and ex-post reviews 
and evaluations of the intervention.  
Reason 10: The cost-benefit analysis which has been carried out two years after the start by a consult-
ing company (Gematik, 2006) should have taken place in the beginning for choosing the right service 
to start with. The resulting report was not published by the government but it was leaked by a hacker 
organization. This report provides a cost-benefit calculation for each service planned to be realized as 
a part of the health card project. Such relevant information should be made publically available. 
Reason 11: The cost/benefit analysis showed a negative benefit for a five and ten year perspective for 
the electronic prescription (Gematik, 2006). In comparison with all other services, the electronic pre-
scription had the lowest net benefit of -376 million Euros in a five-year period. These calculations 
were based on the assumption that the electronic prescription will not lead to additional work. As the 
results from the test phases showed, this assumption was wrong. If the additional time needed in the 
practices would have been taken into account, the expected benefit should be even lower than calcu-
lated. The cost-benefit analysis revealed (upfront) an unbalanced distribution of the costs and benefits 
among the different stakeholders for the electronic prescription. While the health insurance companies 
would profit from savings in the billing process, the physicians and the pharmacists would have higher 
costs than benefits. Work would be shifted from the health insurance companies for digitizing the pre-
scription data used for billing purposes to the physicians.  
Reason 12: The bias in cost/benefit became even worse in later phases of the intervention. In the test 
phase, the benefits for the insurance companies (to integrate their back end systems) could not be real-
ized due to delays in realizing the telematics infrastructure.  
Reason 13: Assessments during the course of the interventions – such as those mentioned above or 
further risk analysis e. g. about timely availability of security infrastructure – mentioned were not tak-
en too much into account. They were neither mitigated in the further steps nor did they quickly lead to 
reprioritization or rescheduling.  
We added an additional concept to the framework, which we missed during our analysis. We call the 
concept the intervention governance (B8).  
Reason 14: Throughout the whole intervention, the governance structures were not clear and changed 
over time. They were challenged several times by the diverse actors involved. The self-administration 
(mainly consisting of health insurance companies and health providers) in some situations was not 
able to meet a decision. In these situations, the ministry of health decided how to proceed. The newly 
founded central actor gematik had the role of writing specifications and testing devices. Though the 
people at the gematik gathered most knowledge about the whole system, the organization remained a 
weak actor. 
The framework includes two other concepts, which we have not addressed in this section. As the pro-
ject did not reach the mode of operations and monitoring (B7), we skipped this concept. An ongoing 
analysis of potentials of innovations (B2) might be necessary in long-lasting ultra-large projects. In the 
electronic health card intervention, the rise of mobile technologies, for example, will challenge exist-
ing decisions on how the patient might want to interact with his or her health data. 
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5 Discussion 
After we have described our main findings regarding the failure of the project, we discuss the results 
in this section. We first outline the contributions of our work to the body of knowledge. Second, we 
address the limitations of our work. This is followed by a reflection on the use of the framework for 
analyzing IT-based interventions in business ecosystems. 
So far, the failure of the implementation of the electronic prescription in Germany has not been ana-
lyzed in the scientific literature. With the case study presented in this paper, we seek draw the atten-
tion towards this failure. Until today, many countries are on the way to build or extend their national 
health infrastructures in order to realize additional services for patients and health care professionals. 
However, until today, detailed and current information on similar projects and failures is scarce. 
A major discriminator from other projects is the weak governance performed by the German policy 
makers. The distributed power structure and its large size hinders the German system from quickly 
implementing new technologies. In smaller (e. g. Scandinavian) countries and in those with more cen-
tralized governance (like in the UK) the implementation of such projects seems to be easier. 
While the governance structure will not be changed rapidly, it is worth to look for other ways of how 
to proceed. Two things seem to be of greater importance: First, the savings, which might arise from 
the changes in the billing process should be realized right on from the beginning. If the effort for the 
physicians rises (which needs detailed evaluation), it might be necessary to transfer a part of the gen-
erated savings to them as a compensation. The overall cost/benefit-situation needs to be analyzed and 
tracked carefully. Second, detailed socio-technical and architectural analyses should be carried out 
throughout the project. Defining standards and specifications that do not consider the situation in prac-
tices and hospitals are likely to fail. Though ultra-large projects and architectures need some ex-ante 
planning, the projects should rather proceed in an iterative way. There is no reason to set up eight field 
tests at the same time all running into similar problems. A permanent alignment between central ac-
tivities and the hundreds or even thousands of decentral projects in hospitals and at the hardware and 
software vendors involved is required. This permanent alignment process should also be capable of 
taking new technologies into account. Large parts of the German projects were planned at a time were 
smartphones were not available, for example. As such technological shifts are likely to happen in the 
future, national health IT projects should include mechanisms to adopt new technologies. 
Similar to the findings of Kreps and Richardson (2007), the project’s sheer size, scale and complexity 
can be seen as a major cause for its failure. Compared to their list of “issues in IT project failure” 
(ibid, p. 443), we can identify several similarities. First, in both cases, the systems were delivered too 
late. Second, needs of the ‘users’ and ‘stakeholders’ were not taken into account as required. Especial-
ly, there was a lack of consultation with the physicians in both cases. Third, in both cases, the existing 
legacy systems were not considered appropriately. In our case, the time needed for implementing new 
functionality and interfaces was dramatically underestimated. The projects’ focus on the new infra-
structure and systems seems to lead to an underestimation of the effort needed to change the existing 
systems (and processes). Fourth, the scope changed in both projects. In the German project, the shift 
towards using the offline-mode in the prescription process was a major scope “creep”. 
As we have described above, the framework from Drews et al. (2014) was developed iteratively out of 
three cases. While it turned out to be a useful frame during the analysis, we see four major differences 
that emerge from the use of the framework in this paper. First, we started with the project’s drivers and 
goals for setting the scene. This was important as the focal project shaped the boarder of the ecosys-
tem’s parts that are relevant for our analysis. Second, we have introduced a timeline, which provides 
an overview on different episodes and projects. So far, the dynamic perspective did not include a con-
cept for explicitly describing the course of the project along the timeline. In an ex-ante consideration 
and planning of an IT-based intervention, this timeline has the character of a project plan. In our case, 
the timeline was used to structure the events of the past. In both cases, the timeline is a useful tool that 
should be helpful for other cases as well. Third, our focal intervention consists of many separate pro-
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jects. We have defined several different types of projects (like planning & designing). In large inter-
ventions, there may be several instances (up to several hundred or thousand) of these projects. Fourth, 
the governance and management layers we used in the timeline point out that several actors might be 
much more influential in large projects than others. They define laws, standards or may protest against 
the planned changes. In the German health care system, the leading associations are very powerful 
actors following their own strategies and agendas. Analyzing their behavior and their major decisions 
helps to better understand the factors leading to success and failure. The impact of their decisions on 
other actors and activities should be carefully analyzed in such large systems. 
Our analysis is limited as we used only publically available documents for grounding our empirical 
findings. For taking a closer look and for gaining a better understanding of certain decisions, which 
were made during the project, additional expert interviews would be a valuable resource. Additionally, 
the applied framework might be a restriction as it guides the analytical focus with its concepts. A more 
open and bottom-up approach or other frameworks might lead to different results. 
6 Conclusion and outlook 
In this paper, we have analyzed the failed introduction of the electronic prescription in Germany. By 
drawing on a framework for analyzing IT-based interventions in business ecosystems, we were able to 
present a brief overview of important activities during this intervention. Furthermore, we identified 14 
reasons for its failure and used the framework for categorizing these reasons. This list is not compre-
hensive, additional data, especially from expert interviews with people involved in that project might 
provide further insights from “behind the scenes”.  
Additionally, we proposed some extensions to the framework from Drews et al. (2014) by adding a 
timeline with different layers to the dynamic perspective. For our analysis, we did not strictly follow 
the framework’s concepts. Instead, we switched forth and back, gathered further material and went 
back to analysis. The framework should be enriched to become an architectural framework for analyz-
ing ultra-large IT-based interventions. In order to fulfill this task, appropriate modelling languages 
should be identified for each layer. Furthermore, the framework should interconnect the different lay-
ers and assure an integrated way for analyzing and planning ultra-large architectures. Such a frame-
work should help to avoid failures like the one we have analyzed in this paper. 
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